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14. ABSTRACT The United States' use of private military contractors during wartime dates back to the Revolutionary War when "sutlers" would follow behind the army selling merchandise to troops. With current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is not feasible for the United States military to provide uniformed personnel to conduct all security and logistical missions. Private contractors have been called upon to provide a wider scope of services on the battlefield than ever before. However, procedures private firms utilize to accomplish their missions may unknowingly undermine theater-strategic or operational objectives. This paper will examine the adequacy of current military doctrine on the use of contractors, the extent to which contractors are involved in military planning, and how early integration in the planning process can achieve greater mission success. Future military operations will rely even more heavily on contractor support; therefore, to ensure unity of effort, commanders and their staffs must understand how to effectively plan for and implement contractors on the battlefield.					
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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

**MILITARY CONTRACTORS: HOW EARLIER INTEGRATION IN THE
PLANNING PROCESS WOULD ACHIEVE GREATER MISSION SUCCESS.**

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

The United States' use of private military contractors during wartime dates back to the Revolutionary War when "sutlers" would follow behind the army selling merchandise to troops.¹ With current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is not feasible for the United States military to provide uniformed personnel to conduct all security and logistical missions. Private contractors have been called upon to provide a wider scope of services on the battlefield than ever before. However, procedures private firms utilize to accomplish their missions may unknowingly undermine theater-strategic or operational objectives. This paper will examine the adequacy of current military doctrine on the use of contractors, the extent to which contractors are involved in military planning, and how early integration in the planning process can achieve greater mission success. Future military operations will rely even more heavily on contractor support; therefore, to ensure unity of effort, commanders and their staffs must understand how to effectively plan for and implement contractors on the battlefield.

1. Richard W. Singer, "Outsourcing the Fight," *Forbes*, 05 June 2008, www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0605_military_contractors_singer.aspx (accessed 12 February 2010).

INTRODUCTION

The United States military relies on contractors to provide a greater variety of services during wartime than ever before. Contracts range from food service and sanitation to private armed security. Contractors are now performing functions that only uniformed personnel executed in past conflicts. In the performance of their duties, some contractors have a narrow focus and use techniques that alienate civilian populations and ultimately undermine the efforts of the military.

Joint task force and combatant commanders must consider in the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) the role contractors will play in an operation. If contractor support is not identified early in the JOPP, conflicts can arise between the work mandated under a government contract and the missions being performed by the U.S. military.² Contracted support is complex and comes with costs that often are not apparent to military planners and operators. Proper planning will better integrate the contractor force into military operations and mitigate unplanned burdens on the joint force. The importance of early integrated planning cannot be overemphasized to ensure coordination and cooperation of all forces toward the commonly recognized objective.³ However, there is little doctrine governing the planning, implementation, and oversight of contractors in a joint environment. Commanders must direct earlier integration of contractors with military planners in the JOPP to achieve unity of effort.

2. David A. Wallace, "The Future Use of Corporate Warriors with the U.S. Armed Forces: Legal, Policy, and Practical considerations and Concerns," *Defense AR Journal*, July 2009, 127.

3. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Operational Contract Support*, Joint Publication (JP) 4-10 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 17 October 2008), I-9.

The number of contractors in both Iraq and Afghanistan now exceeds the number of uniformed personnel in those operations. This paper will analyze the planning, implementation, and management of these contractors and ways to improve current processes. Training staff planners as well as examining current joint doctrine will determine whether they are adequate to support effective contractor integration in the JOPP.

Beyond the scope of this paper, future research can focus on the additional complications that arise when contractors assume an increased role on the battlefield. The legal standing of contractors in combat is debatable, specifically when disciplinary action is required or when taken prisoner. Both federal law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice have undergone modifications to deal with this concern. Also, contractors do not always fall under the chain of command of the joint task force or geographic combatant commander; therefore command and control conflicts have arisen. Further examination needs to be conducted on the balance and coordination between the commander's authority and a contracting officer's contractual authority to ensure unity of effort towards the objective.

CONTRACTOR IMPLEMENTATION IN THE CURRENT JOINT ENVIRONMENT

Contracted services are no longer only a source of logistical support, but rather used to leverage significant capabilities such as interpreting, interrogation, and security. In today's military operations, contractors are a significant force multiplier whose expanded roles in combat zones like Iraq and Afghanistan are often indistinguishable from missions performed by their uniformed counterparts.⁴ This is significant because Iraqi and Afghan civilians do not differentiate the actions of private military contractors from those of personnel in uniform. In Iraq, situations have transpired in which private security contractors

4. Wallace, "The Future Use of Corporate Warriors with the U.S. Armed Forces: Legal, Policy, and Practical considerations and Concerns," 125.

have pushed traffic off the road and shot at vehicles that looked suspicious.⁵ Although these actions may have been required to accomplish their contractual tasks, they have been a detriment to the mission. The manner in which a contractor executes the tasks in his contract must not be in conflict with the overall strategic, operational, or tactical objectives or the commander's desired end state. When there is a disconnect between military objectives and the manner a contractor carries out their task, it can create theater-wide vulnerabilities that undermine the overall mission.

Peter Singer, senior fellow of Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institute, explains how an instance of contractor negligence can harm U.S. objectives. "The Blackwater episode [in 2004] resonated negatively not merely inside Iraq, but throughout the Muslim world...The Al-Jazeera satellite news channel reported on the U.S. hired contractors as 'an army that seeks fame, fortune, and thrill, away from all considerations and ethics of military honor.' ...One of the most influential commentators in the entire Arab world (Fahmy Howeydi) compared Blackwater 'mercenaries' to al-Qaida, coming to Iraq's chaos to seek their fortunes."⁶

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) report in 2004 examined whether military planners followed established processes in the planning for Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. The report identified Department of Defense (DOD) guidance that highlights the early identification of contractor requirements as key to maximizing the effectiveness of contractor support—that contractor integration during planning is a governing principle for contractor support to be effective and responsive. The GAO reported that the U.S. Army did not follow the planning processes described in its own regulations for contractor planning in

5. Peter W. Singer, "The Dark Truth about Blackwater," *Salon*, 02 October 2007, www.brookings.edu (accessed 12 February 2010).

6. Ibid.

Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Iraq. In Iraq, U.S. Army Central Command raised the security classification for certain stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) above the clearance level of the personnel with the most experience in planning and writing contracts. Therefore, two key principles needed to maximize contractor support—a comprehensive statement of work and early contractor involvement—were not achieved.⁷

Even considering uncertainty that exists in wartime planning and operations, the U.S. military did not take full advantage of time during phase 0 (shaping) and phase 1 (detering) of the JOPP for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The lack of detailed planning, in addition to increased expenses, caused a significant amount of rework for planners, contractors, and contracting officers. It is critical that the contractor be involved in the planning process as soon as possible to maximize time to formulate the contractor implementation plan, hire and train the required personnel, and procure the proper type of equipment and move it into the theater to support the mission. Time spent revising plans, orders, and contracts detracts from time for training, rehearsal, and preparations for current and follow-on missions. With insufficient joint doctrine, it is difficult for the combatant commander to develop and disseminate to subordinate commanders a theater standard operating procedure (SOP) for the utilization of contractors. The GAO determined that for OIF existing DOD guidance did not adequately provide the combatant commander detailed operational level procedures of how to properly implement contractors during contingency operations.⁸

In the planning and execution of contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military acquisition community discovered contract activities between the components were

7. U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Military Operations: DOD's Extensive Use of Logistics Support Contracts Requires Strengthened Oversight* (Washington, DC: GAO, 2004), 18.

8. Karen E. LeDoux, "LOGCAP 101: An Operational Planner's Guide," *Army Logistician* 37, no. 3 (June 2005): 24.

in need of improved coordination. Each U.S. Armed Service has its own organizations and procedures for managing deployed contractor personnel. These programs remain separate and uncoordinated, which results in disjointed policies, duplication of capabilities, and different styles of management.⁹ The Army Deputy Commanding General for Logistics in Iraq commented in a 2005 GAO report that he believed a general officer was needed to provide overall coordination for contracting programs to alleviate confusion and interact with all components to advocate for the most effective use of resources.¹⁰ The GAO captured this recommendation in its report and it was later enacted into law through Senator John Warner's National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2007. However, joint doctrine published in 2008 failed to mandate that a senior commissioned officer act as a head of contingency contracting and report to the relevant combatant commander as directed.¹¹

There are other personnel shortfalls in joint planning groups that hinder optimum planning and implementation of contractors during contingency operations. Even if requirements for contractors are addressed early in the planning cycle, making these requirements reality can be challenging for many joint forces due to a lack of acquisition expertise on staff. Without these professionals, staffs cannot examine the myriad of complex contracting options and they may not choose the best fit for an operation.¹² A lack of integration between the acquisition community and operational planners has created a gap between a combatant commander's plans and his mission that requires contractor support.

9. Michael McPeak and Sandra Ellis, "Managing Contractors in Joint Operations: Filling the Gaps in Doctrine," *Army Logistician*, April 2004, 7.

10. U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Defense Logistics: High-Level DOD Coordination Is Needed to Further Improve the Management of the Army's LOGCAP Contract* (Washington, DC: GAO, 2005), 18.

11. U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Contract Management: DOD Developed Draft Guidance for Operational Contract Support but Has Not Met All Legislative Requirements* (Washington, DC: GAO, 2008), 4.

12. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Operational Contract Support*, III-16.

Providing proper military oversight of contractor personnel in support of military operations is imperative to ensure proper integration into the operational support structure. Since geographic combatant commanders do not possess their own contracting authority, they have to rely on one of their subordinate components to provide this service. Services' contracting officers may not be familiar with policies and procedures of the joint command. Due to the nature of contracted support, contractor management is accomplished through numerous channels which may not be under the direct combatant or joint force commander command and control. Only contractor management can directly supervise contractor employees. "One of the key challenges for the supported geographic combatant commander and subordinate joint force commanders is that for many contracts the contracting officer may not be located within the operational area."¹³ This is problematic because comprehensive oversight can be difficult if the contracting officer is not "on-site." This reinforces the necessity for contracting officers to be aware of operational objectives throughout the scope of the contract.

A lack of integration drives duplication of effort and extensive contractual rework which leads to higher costs and wasted taxpayer dollars. In order for the Department of Defense to receive the best value for the billions of dollars spent on contractor services, the right people are needed to write statements of work and oversee contractor performance. In January 2008, the GAO reported the Army neither adequately planned with the contractor nor provided sufficient oversight for an equipment maintenance contract in Kuwait. Deficient statements of work, unclear expectations, sparse contract management, and poor

13. Ibid., IV-2.

contractor performance resulted in the Army spending \$4.2 million to rework items that were presented to the Army as meeting contract standards but failed Army inspection.¹⁴

Contracting in a theater can have positive and sometimes negative effects on the civil-military aspects of the overall operational plan (OPLAN). The common practice of awarding the majority of theater support contracts to local vendors is beneficial, since it promotes goodwill with the local population and improves the local economic base. In Iraq and Afghanistan, where many civil-military operations have taken place, there has been a high degree of local unemployment, which has led to unrest and caused the local nationals to support insurgency simply for monetary compensation. Depending on the scale of contracted support, the joint force commander can use civil-military contracting as one mechanism to support the overall objectives. However, planning and executing these civil-military contracting actions can be manpower intensive. It is imperative that planners integrate contractor support early in the JOPP because if contracting initiatives are not properly staffed, a contracting officer can quickly be overwhelmed in the dual mission of coordinating both force support and support to civil authorities.¹⁵ (Force support is providing the necessary supplies to the warfighter, whereas support to civil authorities is focused on stability and reconstruction operations.)

To comply with Congressional mandates in the National Defense Authorization Acts of 2007 and 2008, the Joint Staff provided guidance on the development of a contractor support integration plan (CSIP). In all operations where significant use of contracted support is anticipated, the combatant commander and subordinate commanders and staffs are to ensure this support is properly addressed in appropriate OPLANs via a CSIP. As an

14. U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on DOD Planning for the Drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq*. (Washington, DC: GAO, 2009), 16.

15. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Operational Contract Support*, III-24.

operation progresses, contractor support will shift based on the operational phase: mobilization, initial deployment, joint reception, staging, onward movement, integration, sustainment, and redeployment.¹⁶ Despite the directive to identify all contractor support requirements in appropriate OPLANs, the GAO discovered that combatant commands were unclear on who should be identifying and defining those requirements due to a lack of contractual expertise organic to a combatant commander's staff. Based on analysis of information obtained from all geographic combatant commanders, the GAO observed few plans included contractor support requirements.¹⁷

Contractor management planning is related to, but not the same as, a contracting support integration plan. While the CSIP is focused on how the DOD will acquire and manage contracted support, contractor management planning focuses on the government's obligations under the terms and conditions of the contract to provide support to the contractor. Joint doctrine addresses the need for contractor management planning but does not provide guidance to facilitate the implementation of this crucial function. Guidance is needed because the joint force or combatant commander does not have a single primary or special staff officer responsible to lead the contractor management planning effort.¹⁸ This lack of integration creates confusion and a breakdown of unity of effort on the battlefield. Because of this planning and integration failure, units required to provide support to contractors have been unaware of additional requirements placed on them, and in some cases unaware contractors were present in their operating area.

The results of insufficient planning and integration between contractor and uniformed personnel can be disastrous, as seen in 2004 in Fallujah, Iraq. A Marine unit had deployed

16. Ibid., xvi.

17. U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Contract Management*, 24.

18. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Operational Contract Support*, xviii.

into the area with a counterinsurgency plan to simultaneously build up local trust and flush out insurgents. Without any coordination with the Marine unit, a convoy of armed personnel employed by Blackwater, Inc. drove through Fallujah directly into an ambush, resulting in the deaths of four contractors. The Marines were unaware of the contractors' presence or that an attack had taken place until an embedded reporter at their base relayed the news from a wire-service report. "With images of the contractors' mutilated bodies making the press, the Marines were ordered to seize the entire city, despite their protests that it would worsen the situation."¹⁹ The incident proved a disaster for the effort of winning support from the local populace.²⁰

U.S. military officers frequently express their frustration with sharing the battlefield with private contractors operating under their own rules and agendas. "In 2005," writes Singer, "Brigadier General Karl Horst, deputy commander of the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division (responsible for security in the Bagdad area at the time), tried to keep track of the contractor shootings in his sector. Over the course of two months, he found twelve shootings that resulted in at least six Iraqi civilian deaths and three more wounded. As Horst tellingly put it, 'these guys run loose in this country and do stupid stuff. There's no authority over them, so you can't come down on them hard when they escalate force. They shoot people and someone else has to deal with the aftermath.'"²¹

A breakdown in coordination and planning exists not just between contractors and uniformed personnel, but between the Services themselves. When contractors are identified as being needed for an operation, there are three main contracting organizational options.

19. Peter W. Singer, "The Dark Truth about Blackwater," *Salon*, 02 October 2007, www.brookings.edu (accessed 12 February 2010).

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

“The *Service Component Support to Own Forces Option* allows the Service component commanders to retain control of their own theater support contracting authority and organizations.”²² This construct is the easiest to implement with no joint integration; however contracts written using this method are more likely to duplicate efforts and create possible conflicts because of the lack of integration with all uniformed personnel on the battlefield. The *Lead Service Organizational Option* (specific Service chosen to provide consolidated theater contracting support for a particular geographical region) designated by the geographic combatant commander is most appropriate for major, long-term operations where the commander wants to ensure consolidated contracting efforts. But in a larger or more complex operation, the commander may require more oversight than this option can provide. In this case, the *Joint Theater Support Contracting Command Option* would be most appropriate.²³ Joint doctrine identifies these three contracting options; however, the two options that integrate contractor support between Services, the *Lead Service* and the *Joint Theater Support Contracting Options*, have no formal established model.²⁴ The GAO criticized the DOD’s policies as lacking sufficient guidance and a preplanned organizational approach for joint contingency planning in the use of contractors.²⁵

RECOMMENDATIONS

Effective contract support is driven by timely and accurate identification of requirements. When requirements are identified early in the JOPP, planners can effectively develop and implement prioritization and synchronization of contractor support to ensure the commander receives the necessary support at the right place and time. Determining these

22. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Operational Contract Support*, xv.

23. *Ibid.*, xv.

24. *Ibid.*, G-1.

25. U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Contract Management*, 3.

requirements is a command, not contracting, function.²⁶ This process involves staff members from all codes, not just logisticians and acquisition personnel. Joint Publication 5-0 (*Joint Operation Planning*) explains “OPLANs developed during contingency planning may contain assumptions that cannot be resolved until a potential crisis develops. However, assumptions should be replaced with facts as soon as possible. The staff accomplishes this by identifying the information needed to convert assumptions to facts and submitting an information request to an appropriate agency...Although there may be exceptions, the staff should strive to resolve all assumptions before issuing the OPORD.”²⁷

Although much of the support provided by contractors will be utilized during contingency operations, many contracts are pre-awarded to facilitate rapid execution when called to action. To enhance the integrated planning process, commanders must solicit input and incorporate the contractor’s planning cell with the members of the joint planning staff. Because contracts are pre-awarded, contractor input would not present a conflict of interest. An underutilized provision contained in contingency contracts calls for the contractor to provide a planning cell to analyze the existing theater OPLANs and CONPLANs and assist in documenting contractor support in annexes of the plans. Planners and contractors should collectively write Annex W of an OPLAN and convert assumptions to facts. Quality, upfront integrated planning with sufficient time will ensure success in providing support during the operation. At the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom the northern theater-opening option through Turkey developed by U.S. European Command and U.S. Army Europe in

26. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Operational Contract Support*, I-11.

27. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 26 December 2006), III-26.

conjunction with contractors tasked with providing civilian engineering support is a good example of contractor planning cells' effective integration with military planners.²⁸

Commanders and human resources personnel must address the lack of deployable contracting personnel with contingency contracting experience. The commander's joint staff must be resourced with personnel with the appropriate skill sets to implement contractors in theater. A team of deployable personnel could be assembled comprised of contracting officers, quality assurance representatives, and individuals with experience in combatant command level planning, operations, and contracting that would possess the appropriate tools and authority to oversee contracting management during contingency operations.²⁹ This team could be incorporated with the current Standing Joint Force Headquarters -Core Element (SJFHQ-CE) which "provides each geographic combatant commander with a trained, standing joint element specifically organized to accelerate the transition of Service operational headquarters to a joint task force headquarters."³⁰

Military personnel outside the acquisitions field often have little knowledge of contractor capabilities, contract processes, or how to incorporate contractors in planning. It is vital commanders, planners, and operators understand strengths, limitations, and unique nuances that contractors bring to the fight. Leaders must be trained in how to most effectively integrate contractor personnel and how to handle the subsequent management and operational challenges facing the combatant commander when contractors are present in theater.³¹ Blocks of instruction addressing contractors' increased role on the battlefield and

28. LeDoux, "LOGCAP 101: An Operational Planner's Guide," 28.

29. U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Contract Management*, 17.

30. "Standing Joint Force Headquarters – Core Element Primer," (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 04 February 2010), 4.

31. McPeak and Ellis, "Managing Contractors in Joint Operations: Filling the Gaps in Doctrine," 7.

integrating contractors into joint planning could be added to the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course (JFOWC). This training requirement could be codified by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) which “distributes policies, procedures, objectives, and responsibilities for the officer professional military education (PME) and joint officer professional military education (JPME).”³²

In addition to a training syllabus, joint staffs should be required to integrate contract requirements into training simulations, mission rehearsals, and exercises.³³ Rehearsals can expose vulnerabilities that can be addressed prior to mission execution. In many operations, multiple contracting activities compete for the same locally available commercial resources. It is important that the geographic combatant commander develop and rehearse to ensure visibility of all contract requirements. Contracting requires centralized planning and decentralized execution to ensure effective, efficient use of limited local resources.³⁴

To ensure unity of effort, the law requiring assignment of a senior commissioned officer to act as head of contingency contracting and report directly to the appropriate combatant commander must be enforced.³⁵ This principal official would synchronize activities between the components and could facilitate finding economies and efficiencies. Given the billions of dollars spent on military contracts every year, the criticality of their success to military operations and the existing convoluted reporting chain for contractors,

32. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP),” CJCSI 1800.01D (Washington, DC: CJCS, 15 July 2009).

33. U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Contract Management*, 25.

34. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Operational Contract Support*, I-10.

35. U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Contract Management*, 4.

high level oversight and coordination is crucial to ensure the contract is being implemented in support of military objectives.³⁶

COUNTERARGUMENTS

The counterargument can be presented that no matter how early or detailed the integration of contractors with military leaders in the JOPP, it will not ensure the coordination and cooperation of all forces toward the commonly recognized objective. Private contractors are being asked to perform tasks that uniformed personnel carried out in previous conflicts. However, civilian contractors are not bound by the same ethos, codes, structures, and obligations as those who voluntarily took an oath upon entering military service. Contractors' responsibility is different from the overall military objective. Their primary interest is to satisfy, by any means necessary, the statement of work outlined in their contract regardless if they enrage the local populace in the process. Even if the contracting firm is performing its roles properly and there exists perfect oversight and accountability, the different sense of *our job* and *the mission* is the fundamental disconnect between private contractor goals and U.S. military objectives.³⁷

A critical task for commanders and staffs is to determine what roles in the theater of operations are appropriate for contractors to fulfill. It can be agreed the question is not *if* contractors should be used in support of uniformed personnel, but rather in what capacity. Requiring contractors that provide sustainment services to be in harm's way and relying on them to sustain troops in contact with the enemy is unreasonable and setting our military personnel up for disaster. The chief operating officer for KBR's logistics operations wrote in an internal memo, "We cannot allow the Army to push us to put our people in harm's way.

36. U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Defense Logistics*, 5.

37. Peter W. Singer, "Blackwater Hearings Ain't No Superbad," *Wired*, 03 October 2007, www.brookings.edu (accessed 12 February 2010).

If we in management believe the Army is asking us to put our KBR employees in danger that we are not willing to accept, then we will refuse to go.”³⁸ There have been many instances of contractors, supplying fuel and supplies to troops on the front line, refusing to advance after meeting resistance from insurgents. This choice has resulted in troops being cut off from critical lines of communication. However, as civilians, this decision is theirs to make. As retired Army General Barry McCaffrey testified to Congress in 2007, the consequences of relying so heavily on private civilian firms, which have the right to decide when and where they deploy, turns military operations into a “deck of cards”.³⁹

The reality is that combat operations conducted by the U.S. military will be carried out by uniformed personnel in conjunction with private firms. Increased integration between military planners and operators with contractor personnel will yield greater understanding of each other’s capabilities, limitations, and method of operating on the battlefield. Therefore early integration needs to take place. “Sound sequencing and synchronization of all military and nonmilitary sources of power are necessary to accomplish strategic and operational objectives in a given theater through campaigns and major operations.”⁴⁰

CONCLUSIONS

The U.S. military has shown a dramatic increase in its reliance on contractors in the battlespace. Contractors are a force multiplier whose capabilities are maximized when joint doctrine provides a framework to the commander on how to best integrate non-military personnel to ensure coordination and cooperation of all forces toward the commonly recognized objective. Once joint doctrine is established, commanders will better understand

38. Richard W. Singer, “Outsourcing the Fight,” *Forbes*, 05 June 2008, www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0605_military_contractors_singer.aspx (accessed 12 February 2010).

39. *Ibid.*, 2.

40. Milan N. Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*. (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2009), I-11.

their roles and responsibilities in the planning and execution of contingency operations that involve contractor personnel. The benefits and skills that contractors bring to the fight have not been fully realized because of incremental, bottom-up planning rather than top-down guidance and integrated staff planning. Underdeveloped joint contracting management processes and a lack of knowledge and guidance at all levels of command has proven to have an adverse effect on the overall mission.⁴¹

Early identification of requirements provided by contractors must be integral to the JOPP. The integration between military planners and contractor personnel in the staff planning and execution processes is critical to maximize contractor capabilities and to ensure unity of effort. Integrated preparation will allow planners to examine carefully the implications of relying on contractors for support and appropriately determine their role. Planners and operators will better understand responsibilities of supported units and the intricacies involved in replacing organic military capabilities with a third party contractor.⁴²

Contracted support and its associated management challenges must be closely integrated early in the planning process. Contracted support is a force multiplier for the joint commander. However, the utilization of contractors is complex and entails costs that may not be apparent to military planners. Proper planning will better integrate the contractor force into military operations and reduce unplanned burdens on the joint force.⁴³ The importance of early integration of contractors with military leaders in the joint planning process of an operation to ensure unity of effort cannot be overemphasized.

41. LeDoux, "LOGCAP 101: An Operational Planner's Guide," 24.

42. LeDoux, "LOGCAP 102: An Operational Planner's Guide," 25.

43. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Operational Contract Support*, I-9.

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